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NOTE
BEYOND THE RHETORIC OFCOMPARATIVE INTEREST
BALANCING: AN ALTERNATIVE
APPROACH TO
EXTRATERRITORIAL DISCOVERY
CONFLICTS
I
INTRODUCTION
In a tort action before a U.S. court, the Plaintiff seeks to compel the
corporate Defendant to produce documents held by the Defendant's
Canadian subsidiary. The Defendant counters by moving for a protective
order prohibiting the discovery, arguing that a Quebec blocking statute,
prevents the disclosure of the documents. 2 At stake are the conflicting
interests of the Plaintiff, the Defendant, the United States, and the Canadian
province of Quebec.3 Courts faced with this increasingly common type of
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1. Blocking statutes, or nondisclosure laws, are laws that prohibit the disclosure or removal of
documents located in the territory of the enacting state in compliance with orders of foreign
authorities. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 437
reporter's note 4 (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (REVISED)]. Such legislation is designed to
counter U.S. efforts to secure foreign production and has been enacted in several foreign states,
including Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, India, New Zealand, the
Netherlands, the Philippines, South Africa, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and West Germany.
The complete texts of most of these foreign blocking statutes are reprinted in A. LOWE,
EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION-AN ANNOTATED COLLECTION OF LEGAL MATERIALS (1983).
2. This hypothetical is based on the fact situation presented in State v. Keene Corp., No.
1108600, slip op. (Cir. Ct. Md. July 10, 1986) (granting protective order). The blocking statute
involved in Keene Corp. was the Quebec Business Concerns Records Act, QUE. REV. STAT. ch. D-12
(1977) (hereinafter Quebec Act].
3. The Plaintiff has an interest in having the adjudication go forward with the best evidence
available. In addition to the obvious desire of avoiding the admission of potentially damaging
evidence, the Defendant has an interest in avoiding the criminal sanctions (up to one year's
imprisonment) which may be imposed for violating the provisions of the blocking statute. Quebec
Act, supra note 2, § 5. The interests of the United States include the interest in protecting U.S.
citizens from harmful products and compensating them for injuries resulting from the use of such
products, and the interest in deciding cases on the basis of all relevant information in accord with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The interests of the Province of Quebec
in the nondisclosure of business records located within its borders are reflected in the Quebec Act.
The fact that the Quebec Act makes the removal of records from Quebec in pursuance of an order by
a foreign authority a criminal offense punishable by imprisonment illustrates that the Quebec
Parliament considered protection of business records to be of critical importance to a viable business
environment and to the territorial integrity of the province. Quebec Act, supra note 2.
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extraterritorial jurisdictional conflict receive scant guidance from the
confused and inconsistent case law and vague authoritative pronouncements
on the subject of extraterritorial discovery.
Most courts ostensibly employ one of several comparative interest
balancing approaches4 to determine whether production should be ordered in
cases in which domestic corporations refuse to produce documents held by
their foreign subsidiaries, branches, or parent corporations because of the
existence of a foreign blocking statute. The term "comparative interest
balancing" denotes a decisionmaking process in which the court identifies the
conflicting interests of each state, weighs each state's interest against that of
the other, and makes a decision according "to the turn of the scale."-5
Although each of the several comparative interest balancing approaches lists
factors to be balanced, none explains how the factors are to be evaluated or
how they are to be weighed against one another. 6 The major weaknesses of
comparative interest balancing are simply that courts lack the institutional
resources and expertise to assess the interests of foreign states and that no
judicially manageable standards exist for assigning weight to competing
national interests. 7  As a number of commentators have pointed out,
balancing national interests is a political, not legal task,8 and is unlikely to
produce the predictability and certainty necessary to minimize jurisdictional
conflicts. 9
In recognition of these deficiencies of comparative interest balancing, this
note proposes not a better rule of law, but rather a more realistic and
coherent process for extraterritorial decisionmaking in cases involving
4. For a summary of judicial application of interest balancing, see RESTATEMENT (REVISED),
supra note 1, § 437 reporter's note 7. But see In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1148
(N.D. Ill. 1979).
5. Maier, Interest Balancing and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 31 AM. J. COMP. L. 579, 589 (1983).
6. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 1, § 437(l)(c); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 40 (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)];
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297 (3d Cir. 1979); Timberlane
Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 614 (9th Cir. 1976), afftd, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984).
7. These weaknesses were noted in In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1139, 1148
(N.D. Il1. 1979), where the court rejected the comparative interest balancing approach and
concluded:
Aside from the fact that the judiciary has little expertise, or perhaps even authority, to evaluate
the economic and social policies of a foreign country, . . . [i]t is simply impossible to judicially
"balance" these totally contradictory and mutually negating actions.
Similar sentiments were echoed in Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909,
949-50 (D.C. Cir. 1984), in which the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
Given the inherent limitations of the Judiciary, which must weigh these issues in the limited
context of adversarial litigation, we seriously doubt whether we could adequately chart the
competing problems and priorities that inevitably define the scope of any nation's interest in a
legislated remedy.
8. See Gerber, Beyond Balancing: International Law Restraints on the Reach of National Laws, 10 YALE
J. INT'L L. 185, 205 (1984); Durack, Australia: Conflicts and Comity, in ACT OF STATE AND
EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY 41, 44 (J. Lacey ed. 1983); Onkelinx,
Conflict of InternationalJuisdiction: Ordering the Production of Documents in 'iolation of the Law af the Situs, 64
Nw. U.L. REV. 487. 531 (1969).
9. See Note, Predictability and Comity: Toward Common Principles of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 98
HARV. L. REV. 1310, 1322 (1985); Gerber, supra note 8.
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conflict between discovery and foreign blocking statutes. This note focuses
on the distinction between interest balancing within the realm of "private
law" and "public law."' 0 The critical difference lies in the fact that interest
balancing in public law cases has operated as a means of asserting the primacy
of U.S. interests'' in the guise of applying a "jurisdictional rule of reason."' 12
Although courts profess to apply a comparative interest balancing approach,
in public law cases they actually exercise enforcement jurisdiction' 3 whenever
more than a de minimis U.S. interest is present; consideration of foreign
interests is rarely more than perfunctory.' 4 Only in private law cases are
courts willing to defer to foreign interests.' 5 This note seeks to conform the
courts' rhetoric to reality by providing an analytical framework which
acknowledges that interest analysis has actually been, by necessity, unilateral
and non-comparative.
Before setting forth the proposed approach, this note first examines the
several balancing approaches that courts have attempted to follow. Next, this
note exposes the deficiencies inherent in comparative interest balancing.
Finally, this note describes a methodological paradigm that more accurately
reflects the substance, if not the form, ofjudicial decisionmaking in the area of
extraterritorial discovery than do comparative interest balancing
formulations.
I
COMPARATIVE INTEREST BALANCING
A. Societe Internationale: A Legacy of Confusion
The United States is presently the only nation which regularly compels
foreign discovery in conflict with local foreign law.' 6 Prior to 1958, however,
U.S. courts, like their foreign counterparts, deferred to foreign interests on a
10. As defined in this note, "private law" includes cases of a purely private civil law nature such
as contract and tort actions. "Public law" refers to cases of a significant national interest such as
securities, tax, patent, antitrust, and criminal proceedings.
11. See, e.g., Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 950-51 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
12. RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 1, § 503(1).
13. Enforcement jurisdiction is the power of a state "to induce or compel compliance or punish
noncompliance with its laws or regulations .... RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note I, at § 401(3).
Thus, when a court in one state orders a party, under the threat of sanctions for non-compliance, to
produce documents that are located in another state, it exercises enforcement jurisdiction. Id. § 431
comment b.
14. See infra notes 72-73, 86-104 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 105-109 and accompanying text.
16. See Rosenthal & Yale-Loehr, Two Cheers for the ALI Restatement's Provisions on Foreign Discovery,
16 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 1075, 1075-77 (1984). See, e.g., Frischke v. Royal Bank, 17 Ont.2d 388
(1970). In Frischke, the Ontario Court of Appeals declined to order production of documents located
in Panama, stating that notwithstanding exceptional circumstances, "[an Ontario court would not
order a person here to break our laws; we should not make an order that would require someone to
compel another person in that person's jurisdiction to break the laws of that state." Id. at 399. See
also Lonrho Ltd. v. Shell Petroleum Co., I W.L.R. 627, 634-35 (H.L. 1980) (holding that the
existence of a local foreign law prohibiting disclosure prevents the documents from being in a party's
power for the purposes of ordering discovery).
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basis of comity 17 and would not order discovery within the territory of
another state when such disclosure conflicted with the law of that state.' 8 It
was in that year that the Supreme Court, in Societe Internationale Pour
Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers 19 (Societe Internationale),
upheld a production order despite the fact that disclosure of the records
would violate Swiss penal laws and would lead to the imposition of criminal
sanctions.20 Thus began the era of extraterritorial discovery conflict.
In Societe Internationale, a Swiss holding company brought suit against the
Attorney General of the United States to recover property seized during
World War II under the Trading with the Enemy Act. 21 Pursuant to discovery
requests, the district court ordered the plaintiff to produce certain documents
relevant to the issue of plaintiff's possible enemy taint. The records were not
produced on the ground that production would violate Swiss secrecy laws,
which carried criminal penalties, and the district court imposed the sanction
of dismissal with prejudice of plaintiff's complaint. On appeal, the Supreme
Court held that the production order was justified notwithstanding the
nondisclosure law, but held also that a party's failure to comply with a
production order due to inability fostered neither by its own conduct nor by
circumstances within its control did not justify the sanction of dismissal with
prejudice. 22
Societe Internationale is the only case in which the Supreme Court has
directly confronted the issue of conflict between a discovery order of a U.S.
court and a foreign blocking statute. Although Societe Internationale is
universally recognized as holding that severe sanctions for noncompliance
with a production order will be imposed only upon a showing of bad faith,
courts have subsequently focused on various other aspects of the Supreme
Court's decision, such as its bifurcated analysis 23 and its stress on the
importance of the requested documents in illuminating key elements of the
claims. 24 Apart from the requirement of good faith, however, the Supreme
17. Comity has been defined as "a way of saying fair play-that each of two parties will yield to
the one that has interests that are clearly paramount .... Where conflicts arise between sovereigns,
the sovereigns have an obligation to resolve the conflict with restraint, cooperation and good will."
Durack, supra note 8, at 43 (quoting former United States Attorney General, Judge Griffin Bell).
18. See, e.g., Hirshorn v. Hirshorn, 278 A.D. 1006, 1007, 105 N.Y.S.2d 628, 630 (1951).
19. 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
20. Id. at 205.
21. Id. at 199.
22. Id. at 212.
23. The Court in Societe Internationale considered the validity of discovery orders and the issue of
the propriety of sanctions separately, stating: "Such reasons [for noncompliance], and the
willfulness or good faith of petitioner, can hardly affect the fact of noncompliance and are relevant
only to the path which the District Court might follow in dealing with petitioner's failure to comply."
Id. at 208. See Arthur Anderson & Co. v. Finesilver, 546 F.2d 338, 341 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1096 (1976) ("Societe implies that consideration of foreign law problems in a discovery
context is required in dealing with sanctions to be imposed for disobedience and not in deciding
whether the discovery order should issue"). But see SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D.
I11, 117 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (noting that the Second Circuit, unlike other circuits, does not
distinguish the analysis used for deciding to issue an order compelling discovery from that used for
imposing sanctions).
24. See, e.g., In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1146 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
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Court's analysis of the validity of the discovery order is masked in ambiguity.
As a result, the decision has produced more confusion than guidance. 2 5
Much of the confusion surrounding the proper interpretation of Societe
Internationale stems from a passage in the decision in which the Court stated:
We do not say that this ruling would apply to every situation where a party is restricted
by law from producing documents over which it is otherwise shown to have control.
Rule 34-of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-is sufficiently flexible to be adapted
to the exigencies of particular litigation. The propriety of the use to which it is put
depends upon the circumstances of a given case, and we hold only that
accommodation of the Rule in this instance to the policies underlying the Trading with
the Enemy Act justified the action of the District Court in issuing this production
order.2
6
Many courts and commentators have interpreted this language as calling for
"a balancing approach on a case-by-case basis." 27 One court has nevertheless
noted that "the Court gave no hint that the disclosure policies of the
American statute should be balanced against the secrecy policies of the Swiss
law," and concluded instead that "the only pertinent inquiry is the strength of
the American interests." 28  It is more likely that the Court never even
considered, let alone decided, the issue of whether interest balancing is
required. A review of the briefs submitted by the parties in Societe
Internationale reveals that the issue of whether the courts below impermissibly
failed to balance interests before ordering production was never raised.
29
B. The Approach of the Restatements: Factors Without Guidance
For many courts, the question of the proper interpretation of Societe
Internationale was resolved by the American Law Institute when it published
the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States in
1965.30 The prestige of the American Law Institute and of the drafters of the
Restatement (Second) quickly established the Restatement as a leading
authority in cases involving extraterritorial discovery conflicts. 3' The
Restatement (Second) took on enhanced significance because of the confusion
created by Societe Internationale and the fact that American judges are generally
not as familiar with international law as with domestic law.
The Restatement (Second) does not directly address the problem of
extraterritorial discovery conflicts. Instead, it contains a general section
25. For a discussion of the numerous conflicting judicial approaches spawned by Societe
Internationale, see Browne, Extraterritorial Discovery: An Analysis Based on Good Faith, 83 COLUM. L. REV.
1320, 1324-39 (1983).
26. 357 U.S. 197, 205-06 (1958).
27. See, e.g., In re Westinghouse Electronic Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992, 997
(10th Cir. 1977).
28. In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1146 (N.D. IIl. 1979).
29. Brief of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 8 n.9, Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v.
United States Dist. Ct., 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987).
30. Although this was actually the American Law Institute's first Restatement of United States
Foreign Relations Law, it was entitled the "Restatement (Second)" because it was published with a
second wave of other restatement volumes. Rosenthal & Yale-Loehr, supra note 16, at 1082 n.28.
31. Id. at 1082.
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pertaining to international jurisdictional conflicts. This provision declares
that states are required by international law to moderate their exercise of
jurisdiction by weighing all respective interests. 32 The Restatement (Second)
lists five factors to be balanced, including the vital national interests of each of
the states.3 3 The Restatement (Second), however, mentions nothing about
how these factors are to be ascertained or evaluated, and provides no
standards by which the factors may be weighed against each other.
In May 1986, the American Law Institute approved the Restatement
(Revised) of Foreign Relations Law which employs the same type of
comparative interest balancing formulation as the Restatement (Second).3 4
The Restatement (Revised), however, elevates the balancing test from a
doctrine of comity to a criterion of jurisdiction vel non (literally meaning
jurisdiction or not). In contrast to the Restatement (Second), the
Restatement (Revised) requires comparative interest balancing "not as a basis
for requiring that states consider moderating their enforcement of laws which
they are authorized to prescribe, but as an essential element in determining
whether, as a matter of international law, the state has jurisdiction to
prescribe" the laws at all. 35
Although the Restatement (Revised) is in some respects a substantial
improvement over the Restatement (Second),3 6 its balancing formula is no
less vague than that of its predecessor. A comment following its text indicates
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, § 40 states:
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law and the rules they may
prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon the part of a person, each state is required by
international law to consider, in good faith, moderating the exercise of its enforcement
jurisdiction, in the light of such factors as
(a) vital national interests of each of the states,
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions would
impose upon the person,
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of the other state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by actions of either state can reasonably be expected to
achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by the state.
33. Id. § 40(a).
34. RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 1, § 437(l)(c) states:
In issuing an order directing production of information located abroad, a court or agency in the
United States should take into account the importance to the investigation or litigation of the
documents or other information requested; the degree of specificity of the request; whether the
information originated in the United States; the availability of alternative means of securing the
information; and the extent to which noncompliance with the request would undermine
important interests of the United States, or compliance with the request would undermine
important interests of the state where the information is located.
The comment to this section indicates that in addition to these factors, the eight factors listed in
§ 403 of the Restatement (Revised) should also be considered. Id. § 437 comment c.
35. Id. § 403 reporter's note 10. Contrary to the assertion of the American Law Institute,
however, one court has noted that "there is no evidence that interest balancing represents a rule of
international law." Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 950 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
36. Unlike the Restatement (Second), the Restatement (Revised) explicitly adopts various
aspects of the Societe Internationale analysis, such as the requirement of a stringent standard of
relevance and the bad faith prerequisite to the imposition of severe sanctions. RESTATEMENT
(REVISED), supra note 1, § 437(2)b & comment a.
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that the Restatement (Revised)'s list of factors to be balanced is not meant to
be exhaustive and acknowledges that "no special significance or scheme of
priorities is implied in the order in which the factors are listed. Not all factors
are equally important in all situations, and the weight to be given to any
particular factor or group of factors will depend on the circumstances."-
3 7
An impressive number of courts have professed to follow the approach of
the two Restatements of Foreign Relations Law, 38 yet attempts to apply their
hollow balancing formulas have resulted largely in confused, ad hoc
decisionmaking. 39 Judicial refinement and expansion of the list of factors to
be balanced 40 have not added coherence or certainty to the balancing
calculus. Lacking a conceptual structure and an assessable metric for
weighing relative interests, the balancing approach of the Restatements has
failed to provide a basis for developing predictability over time.
C. Aerospatiale: An Opportunity for Clarification Squandered
Despite confused and inconsistent judicial application of the
Restatement's vague balancing formula, the Supreme Court has, since its
1958 holding in Societe Internationale, consistently declined to render additional
guidance on the issue of extraterritorial discovery conflicts. 4 1 The Court's
latest refusal to clarify the criteria that U.S. courts should employ in
determining when to require production of evidence located abroad in
contravention of foreign blocking statutes came in 1987 with its decision in
Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court for the Dist. of
Iowa.4 2
The Aerospatiale case arose out of a products liability suit against French
aircraft manufacturers. When the U.S. plaintiffs sought broad discovery of
evidence located abroad under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
foreign defendants moved for a protective order, arguing that the U.S. court
should prohibit discovery in France through any procedures other than those
provided in the Hague Evidence Convention. Because article 23 of the Hague
Convention provides that contracting states may declare that they will refuse
37. Id. § 403 comment b.
38. Id. § 437 reporter's note 7 (listing cases that have followed the Restatement (Second)
balancing approach. For cases citing the tentative drafts of the Restatement (Revised), see Graco v.
Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 509 (N.D. I1. 1984); United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 699
F.2d 341, 346 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Toyota Motor Corp., 569 F. Supp. 1158, 1162 (C.D.
Cal. 1983).
39. For a discussion of the confused judicial application of the Restatement balancing formula, see
Browne, supra note 25, at 1330-39.
40. See Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297 (3d Cir. 1979);
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 614 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th
Cir. 1984). For an analysis of the Timberlane approach, see Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a
Crossroads: An Intersection Between Public and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280, 296-300
(1982).
41. The Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari in a case raising the issue most recently in In
re Grand Jury Proceedings Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d 817 (11 th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1106 (1985).
42. 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987).
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requests for the type of sweeping pre-trial discovery known in common law
countries, 43 application of the Convention can potentially have an effect
identical to imposition of a blocking statute.44 Therefore, despite the fact that
the case involved application of the Hague Convention rather than conflict
with an actual blocking statute, it nonetheless presented an ideal opportunity
for the Court to refine the formula for resolving all extraterritorial discovery
conflicts.
Citing the comparative interest balancing formula of section 437 of the
Revised Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, the Supreme Court held that
the Hague Convention's procedures constitute an option that a U.S. court
may or may not elect to employ, depending on the outcome of "scrutiny in
each case of the particular facts [and] sovereign interests."-45 The Court,
however, evaded the underlying issue of exactly how the comparative interest
balancing approach is to be applied by stating "[w]e do not articulate specific
rules to guide this delicate task of adjudication." '46
The majority's holding produced a sharply worded dissent in which Justice
Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and O'Connor, exclaimed
that "[e]xperience to date indicates that there is a large risk that the case-by-
case comity analysis now to be permitted by the Court will be performed
inadequately." 47  Arguing that the Court should have instead adopted a
general presumption that courts should resort first to the procedures of the
Hague Convention, Justice Blackmun stated, "I dissent because I cannot
endorse the Court's case-by-case inquiry . . .and its failure to provide lower
courts with any meaningful guidance for carrying out that inquiry." 48 He
concluded that, "[tlhe majority fails to offer guidance in this endeavor, and
thus it has missed its opportunity to provide predictable and effective
procedures for international litigants in United States courts." 49
If the legacy of Societe Internationale can be said to be confusion, the Court's
latest decision involving extraterritorial discovery conflicts will be
remembered as a missed opportunity to resolve that confusion. Although the
majority in Aerospatiale refrained from explicitly stating how its decision would
affect lower court cases involving foreign blocking statutes, it is likely that the
Aerospatiale precedent will be interpreted as endorsing a vague notion of
comparative interest balancing in that context as well.
43. 23 U.S.T. at 2568, TIAS 7444. Thirteen of the seventeen signatory states have made such
declarations under Article 23 of the Convention. See 7 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY 15-19
(1986).
44. See S&S Screw Mach. Co. v. Cosa Corp., 647 F. Supp. 600, 617 (M.D. Tenn. 1986) (granting
protective order in contract case in which, pursuant to article 23 of the Hague Convention, West
Germany refused American pre-trial discovery requests).
45. Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2555-56..
46. 107 S. Ct. at 2557.
47. 107 S. Ct. at 2558. The dissent later elaborated that "courts are generally ill-equipped to
assume the role of balancing the interests of foreign nations with that of our own [and that a] pro-
forum bias is likely to creep into the supposedly neutral balancing process." 107 S. Ct. 2560.
48. 107 S. Ct. at 2558.
49. 107 S. Ct. at 2568.
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D. The Deficiencies of Comparative Interest Balancing
Vagueness is but one of the many deficiencies inherent in comparative
interest balancing which render it an impractical approach to the problem of
extraterritorial discovery conflicts. A second major problem with comparative
interest balancing is that courts are simply unable to ascertain and to evaluate
accurately the interests of the foreign states that are to be weighed against
those of the United States. The Restatement (Second) requires an assessment
of the "vital national interests" of the foreign state, 50 and the Restatement
(Revised) calls for an inquiry as to "the extent to which compliance with an
order to produce the requested information would affect important
substantive policies or interests of the state." 5 1 Yet, unlike the United States
Department of State, the judiciary possesses neither the special training nor
the resources necessary to analyze the economic, political, and social interests
that underlie a foreign state's policies of nondisclosure. Several courts have
acknowledged that the judiciary lacks the "institutional resources," 52 the
expertise, and perhaps even the authority53 to "adequately chart the
competing problems and priorities that inevitably define the scope of any
nation's interest in a legislated remedy." 54
The Act of State doctrine presents a further barrier to the evaluation of the
foreign interests underlying blocking legislation. The doctrine, which
prevents an American court from sitting in judgment of the public acts of
another country, 55 directly conflicts with the position taken by the
Restatement (Revised) that foreign "statutes that frustrate [discovery] need
not be given the same deference by courts of the United States as substantive
rules of law at variance with the law of the United States." 56 One court has
recently rejected this assertion by the Restatement (Revised), noting that it is
"somewhat presumptuous, to gauge the importance of the Blocking Statute to
France." 57 This view was also highlighted in recent litigation in which the
United Kingdom stated that it is as politically intolerable for leaders of foreign
democracies to have their official policies evaluated, balanced, and coerced by
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, § 40(a).
51. RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 1, § 437 comment c.
52. Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
53. In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1148 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
54. Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
55. The doctrine was first promulgated in Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897),
where the Supreme Court declared:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and
the courts of one country will not sit in judgment of the acts of the government of another done
within its own territory.
For a recent example of the doctrine's application, see Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers
v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 198 1), in which the court held that even where no sovereign state is
a party to the action, the Act of State doctrine prevents a federal court from questioning the
propriety of sovereign acts of foreign states such as the price setting activities of OPEC states.
56. RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 1, § 437 reporter's note 5.
57. Graco v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 513 (N.D. I11. 1984).
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U.S. courts as it would be for American leaders to have important U.S.
policies and interests evaluated, judged, and coerced in foreign courts. 58
Even assuming domestic courts have the ability and authority to gauge
vital foreign interests, they cannot reliably and impartially balance the foreign
interests against those of the United States. In Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian
World Airlines,5 9 Judge Malcolm Wilkey of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
argued that domestic courts are incapable of sitting as international tribunals
and evenhandedly balancing national interests. He concluded that "courts
inherently find it difficult neutrally to balance competing foreign interests." 60
Given the vagueness of existing comparative interest balancing approaches, it
is small wonder that a court might be encouraged to assert the primacy of U.S.
interests. A court is likely to have difficulty, especially in a case involving U.S.
nationals, in denying jurisdiction, unless it can base its decision on a concrete
legal principle that clearly prohibits the exercise of such jurisdiction. 6 1
Comparative interest balancing provides no such concrete principle.
Finally, judicial use of comparative interest balancing is contrary to the
political question doctrine which removes certain issues from the scope of
judicial review. 62 In Baker v. Carr,63 the Supreme Court extensively reviewed
the history and evolution of the political question doctrine and explained that
when the resolution of questions touching foreign relations turns on
standards that defy judicial application, or involves the exercise of discretion
demonstrably committed to the executive or legislature, such questions are
nonjusticiable political questions. 64 The preceding discussion has illustrated
that comparative interest balancing incorporates "purely political factors
which the court is neither qualified to evaluate comparatively nor capable of
properly balancing." 65 In his address to the American Bar Association in
August 1981, the Attorney General of Australia, Senator Peter Durack,
explained:
In my view, however, it is not feasible for a court of law applying judicial techniques to
balance the disparate interests of two States which they claim to be of national
importance ....
58. Joint Brief of United Kingdom and Cayman Islands at 16-20, In re Grand Jury Proceedings
(United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia), No. 83-1 (S.D. Fla. filed Feb. 28, 1984), cited in Rosenthal &
Yeal-Loehr, supra note 16, at 1080.
59. 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
60. Id. at 950-51.
61. Gerber, supra note 8, at 209.
62. See generally L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 208-16 (1972). The
political question doctrine, which prevents judicial determination of political questions for which
courts lack competence, is to be contrasted with the Act of State doctrine, which is based on "the lack
of consent by foreign states to review of their actions by domestic courts of another state."
RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 1, § 428 reporter's note 1.
63. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
64. Id. at 211, 217. Although Baker involved the issue of legislative reapportionment, its criteria
have subsequently been employed by countless courts identifying nonjusticiable political questions
in cases involving foreign relations. See, e.g., Cranston v. Reagan, 611 F. Supp. 247, 252 (D.D.C.
1985), and cases cited therein.
65. Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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[I]t is not merely that the courts lack the expertise. It is rather that it is not part of
the judicial function to decide whether a law or policy is justified by what a court
conceives to be in the national interest. That is a political function.
6 6
Appraisal of the national interests of a foreign state is therefore more
appropriately a political rather than a judicial judgment. In accordance with
the political question doctrine, a court should refrain from subscribing to a
formulation whose standards are neither judicially discoverable nor
manageable.
III
PROPOSAL
Given the deficiencies inherent in comparative interest balancing, it is not
surprising that the analyses of the courts in cases involving discovery orders
and foreign nondisclosure laws have been inconsistent and confused. To
resolve the current confusion, and to simplify the task confronting a judge or
attorney in such cases, this note proposes a new framework in which to
examine the factors traditionally analyzed. In contrast to previous
approaches, this proposal does not require an assessment or balancing of
foreign interests. Rather, it requires a straightforward and unilateral
evaluation of domestic interests at the production stage of a trial.
Simply stated, under this proposal a court should issue an order for
discovery upon a finding that the requested information is directly relevant
and upon a further finding of any one of the following: (1) that the case
involves public rather than private law; (2) that the blocking statute is not an
actual barrier to production; or (3) that no reasonable good faith effort to
obtain the documents was made. Accordingly, a court should refrain from
ordering production, or issue a protective order preventing production, upon
a finding that the requested information is not directly relevant or a finding of
all of the following: (1) that the case involves private law; (2) that the blocking
statute presents an actual barrier to production; and (3) that a reasonable
good faith effort to obtain the documents was made. This formulation is
expressed as follows:
66. Durack, supra note 8, at 48.
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COURT SHOULD ORDER PRODUCTION
PUBLIC LAW CASE
OR
DIRECTLY RELEVANT I- A NOT ACTUAL BARRIER
OR
COURT SHOULD NOT ORDER PRODUCTION
NOT DIRECTLY RELEVANT OR
PRIVATE LAW CASEI
AND
ACTUAL BARRIER
IAND
. I
I SUFFICIENT GOOD FAITH
This proposed approach is not incompatible with those of the
Restatements of Foreign Relations Law and Societe Internationale, but rather
serves to supplement them. Although seldom expressly acknowledged, the
proposed framework is in fact reflected in the substance of the case law. The
following discussion examines each element of the proposed formulation,
explains its rationale, and illustrates its application. Like the Reporters' Notes
which explain further the text and comments of the Restatements, the ensuing
discussion is meant to serve as a guide to construing and utilizing the
proposed approach.
A. Stringent Relevancy
The proposed approach embraces a threshold requirement that the
information requested meet a stringent standard of relevance. This
requirement recognizes that courts have uniformly refused to order the
production of information located in a foreign state when the information was
not directly relevant, material, and necessary to the case. The rationale
behind this requirement is based on the fact that the United States is the only
nation which permits domestic discovery not only of clearly relevant material,
but also of information which would be inadmissible at trial yet appears
[Vol. 50: No. 3
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reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 6 7 As
one court explained:
Because [U.S.] courts "are not shackled with strict interpretations of relevancy"
discovery is permitted as to matters that "are or may become relevant," or "might
conceivably have a bearing" on the subject matter of the action, or where there is "any
possibility" or "some possibility" that the matters inquired into will contain relevant
information.
68
Foreign states condemn such sweeping and burdensome discovery as "fishing
expeditions."-69 The fishing expedition it seems, whatever its arguable merits
at home, is unacceptable in international waters. 70
The goal of domestic discovery in the United States is to leave no possibly
relevant stone unturned. This policy differs from that of every other legal
system, where each side is denied such sweeping access to the other's
documents. In foreign states a party may review only those documents
belonging to the other side that it can expect to enter into evidence-those
having a direct and material bearing on the claims or defenses. 7 1 Because
foreign states, their courts, and their citizens have little experience with the
burdens associated with the type of discovery employed in the United States, a
request for foreign discovery should be very specific.
There has been judicial debate over whether Societe Internationale stands for
the proposition that American courts must apply a stringent standard of
relevance in cases of extraterritorial discovery. 7 2 Moreover, the text of the
Restatement (Revised) merely lists "the importance to the investigation or
litigation of the . . . information requested" as one of the several factors that a
court should "take into account,"7'3 while a Reporter's note asserts that the
Restatement (Revised) actually requires "a higher standard [of relevance]
than applies in routine domestic cases." 74  Nowhere in the Restatement
(Revised), however, is such a higher standard defined. The case law, in
contrast, is far less ambiguous. In the context of both public law and private
67. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
68. United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 96 N.M. 155, 174, 629 P.2d 231, 250 (1980),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 901 (1981).
69. In justifying the imposition of the Ontario blocking statute, the Prime Minister of Ontario
stated: "This Government objects very strongly to fishing expeditions through our own Courts, and
it is certainly not prepared to approve of fishing expeditions of this nature into the affairs of our
companies through the Courts of the United States in regard to something which is not properly
before those Courts." International Law Ass'n, Report of the FiftV-First Conference 567 (1964).
70. Brewster, Problems of Discover Abroad, in ACT OF STATE AND EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH:
PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY 66, 69 U. Lacey ed. 1983).
71. D. ROSENTHAL & W. KNIGHTON, NATIONAL LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE: THE
PROBLEM OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY 70 (1983).
72. Compare In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1146 (N.D. Ill. 1979) ("The Court
[in Societe Internationale] .. .suggested that the normal discovery standard of whether a document is
relevant or is calcualted to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence does not apply, and should be
replaced by the higher standard of whether the requested documents are crucial to the resolution of
a key issue ....") with Graco v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 515 (N.D. Il. 1984) ("These cases do
not suggest ... that the discovery requests must meet some exceptionally high standard of relevance;
these cases merely indicate that the importance of the documents is a factor to be considered by the
court.").
73. RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 1, § 437(l)(c).
74. Id. § 437 reporter's note 2.
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law cases, courts uniformly refuse to order production when the requested
information is merely cumulative of available information 75 or nonessential to
the outcome of the case. 7 6
B. The Public Law/Private Law Distinction
Although numerous courts have outwardly employed the balancing
approach of the two Restatements, true comparative interest balancing has
not been undertaken but has instead been converted defacto into a unilateral
assessment of the strength of the U.S. interest in production of the
documents. The approach of the Restatement (Second) and Restatement
(Revised) calls first for an inquiry as to whether "vital" 7 7 or "important" 78
U.S. interests are at stake and second, for a balancing of those interests
against the interests of the foreign state. 79 Because the courts are unable to
undertake successfully the second stage of the evaluation, the decisions turn
instead solely on whether sufficient U.S. interests are involved. As Judge
Wilkey explained in Laker Airways,8 0 "[a] pragmatic assessment of those
decisions adopting an interest balancing approach indicates none where
United States jurisdiction was declined when there was more than a de minimis
United States interest." 8'
As mentioned earlier, it is not clear whether the Supreme Court, in Societe
Internationale, meant to advocate an approach based on comparative interest
balancing or one based on a unilateral interest evaluation. 82 Although the
Court explicitly based its ruling on the fact that vital national policies were
involved,8 3 it is uncertain whether the Court believed that the strength of the
American interests concerned was the only pertinent inquiry.8 4 Nevertheless,
Societe Internationale has been characterized by one court as holding "that a
court should generally order production to effectuate strong Congressional
policies." ' 5 On the surface, most courts have neither agreed with this
interpretation of Societe Internationale nor openly acknowledged engaging in a
unilateral interest evaluation. A look beyond form to substance, however,
indicates that the courts' interest analyses have actually been unilateral and
non-comparative.
75. See, e.g., State v. Keene Corp., No. 1108600, slip op. at 3 (Cir. Ct. Md. July 10, 1986)
(declining to order production in a tort case in which the evidence was "merely cumulative").
76. See, e.g., Graco v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 515-16 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (declining to order
production in a patent infringement suit of those documents characterized by part), opposing
discovery as "not vital or crucial to the resolution of a key issue in the litigation . . ."); Trade Dev.
Bank v, Continental Ins. Co., 469 F.2d 35, 40-41 (2d Cir. 1972) (declining to order production in a
contract case in which the information requested "was not essential to the issue on trial").
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, § 40 comment b.
78. RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 1, § 437(l)(c).
79. See supra notes 32, 34.
80. Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 950-51 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
81. Id. at 951.
82. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
83. Societe Internationale, 357 U.S. 197, 206 (1958).
84. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
85. In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1146 (N.D. 11. 1979).
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An examination of the case law indicates that a bright line has in fact been
drawn between those interests deemed vital and those recognized as
insufficient to warrant a production order when disclosure is prohibited by
foreign law. The Restatement (Second) defined vital national interest as "an
interest such as national security or general welfare to which a state attaches
overriding importance." 86 A former State Department legal advisor has
explained that securities, tax, and antitrust laws are of the type which reflect
important national interests which Congress has chosen to promote and to
protect. 87 Although the Restatement (Revised) suggests that "[i]n making the
necessary determination of the interests of the United States" the court
should "invite the U.S. attorney or other appropriate official to advise it of the
interests of the U.S. government," 88 few courts have taken this route.
Instead, the courts have simply drawn a distinction between cases involving
public law (securities, 89 tax, 9° and other criminal proceedings91 ), including
quasi-public law (patent92 and antitrust actions93 ), and those involving purely
private civil law (contract 94 and tort claims 95 ). A review of the case law further
indicates that it is only in private law cases that courts have been willing to
defer to foreign interests. 96
A close examination of several public law and private law cases involving
discovery and foreign blocking statutes clearly illustrates the distinction. For
example, while purporting to follow the balancing approach of the
Restatement (Second), the Eleventh Circuit, in In re Grand Jury Proceedings,97
made no attempt whatsoever actually to evaluate or to balance the interests of
the Bahamas in its bank secrecy laws. Rather, the Eleventh Circuit simply
asserted that the interest of the United States in upholding the grand jury's
power to investigate crime automatically outweighed the interests of the
Bahamas. 98 After noting the "vital role the grand jury plays in our system of
jurisprudence," 99 the court concluded that it "simply cannot acquiesce in the
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, § 40 comment b.
87. See Robinson, The State Department View, in ACT OF STATE AND EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH:
PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY 58 (J. Lacey ed. 1983).
88. RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 1, § 437 comment c.
89. See, e.g., SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
90. See, e.g., United States v. Vetco, Inc., 691 F.2d 1281, 1289 (9th Cir.), crt. denied, 454 U.S.
1098 (1981).
91. See, e.g., In re GrandJury Proceedings, 691 F.2d 1384, 1387 (11 th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462
U.S. 1119 (1983).
92. See, e.g., Graco v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 512-13 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
93. See, e.g., In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1154 (N.D. I11. 1979).
94. See, e.g., In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992, 999 (10th
Cir. 1977).
95. See, e.g., Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Superior Ct., 123 Cal. App. 3d 840, 857, 176
Cal. Rptr. 874, 884 (1981).
96. D. ROSENTHAL & W. KNIGHTON, supra note 71, at 86.
97. 691 F.2d 1384 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1983) (holding bank in civil
contempt for failing to comply with a production order in a criminal tax and narcotics investigation
despite the existence of foreign bank secrecy laws).
98. Id. at 1391.
99. Id. at 1387.
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proposition that United States criminal investigations must be thwarted
whenever there is conflict with the interest of other states."' 0 0
Similarly, in United States v. Vetco, Inc.,' 0 1 the Ninth Circuit relied on the
Restatement (Second) in reaching its holding that the strong U.S. interest in
collecting taxes and prosecuting tax fraud by its nationals outweighed any
interest Switzerland might have in preserving business secrets of Swiss
subsidiaries of American corporations. Following a pattern similar to that of
the Eleventh Circuit in In re Grand Jury Proceedings, the Ninth Circuit stated that
"[t]here is a strong American interest in collecting taxes from and prosecuting
tax fraud by its own nationals operating through foreign subsidiaries."' 10 2
After a cursory discussion of Swiss interests, the court concluded that "the
United States has a powerful interest in obtaining the summoned documents,
and that Switzerland has a small interest in insisting that they not be
produced."'' 0 3 The Ninth Circuit specifically noted, however, that it might not
have enforced the summons nor imposed sanctions if this had been a case
involving private, rather than public, law.10 4
Although brought by private litigants and not by the government, courts
have determined that patent and antitrust cases fall within the category of
cases involving vital U.S. interests which automatically tip the balance in favor
of compelling discovery. In the patent case of Graco v. Kremlin, Inc., 10 5 for
example, the court stated that U.S. interests of a constitutional magnitude
were implicated.' 06 The court noted further that "U.S. patent laws rely
heavily for their enforcement on private infringement actions'by patent
holders, and pre-trial discovery, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is
an important part of the system of patent enforcement."'' 0 7 Although
purporting to follow the Restatement (Second)'s balancing approach, the
court in Graco declined to gauge the importance of the blocking statute to
France.' 08 Instead, it concluded that "inadequate discovery frustrates the
100. Id. at 1391.
101. 691 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir.), cert. demed, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981).
102. Id. at 1289.
103. Id. at 1291. Butsee United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983)
(balancing the interests of the United States in tax collection against the interests of Greece in its
bank secrecy laws, court declined to enforce an IRS summons directed to production of records
maintained at the bank's Athens branch).
104. In explaining the distinction between public law cases and private civil law cases, the Ninth
Circuit stated: -[T]he instant case turns upon an IRS summons issued pursuant to an investigation
of potentially criminal conduct. Such summonses appear to serve a more pressing national function
than civil discovery." 691 F.2d at 1288. A U.S. district court reached a similar conclusion in United
States v. Toyota Motor Corp., in which the court stated: "IT]he fact that this action was brought by
the government, rather than a private litigant, weighs heavily towards finding a strong American
interest in obtaining the information sought." 569 F. Supp. 1158, 1162-63 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (case
involving tax fraud).
105. Graco v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503 (N.D. I11. 1984).
106. Id. at 512 (United States patent laws enacted by Congress under U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
8).
107. Id. at 513.
108. Id.
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purposes of the patent laws and the Constitution,"'' 0 9 and ordered production
of the documents which were directly relevant to the case.
In antitrust cases, courts have employed an analysis similar to that in Graco
to justify compelling discovery in spite of possible competing foreign
interests. In evaluating the strength of the U.S. interests at issue, one court
stated: "These laws have long been considered cornerstones of this nation's
economic policies, have been vigorously enforced and have been the subject
of frequent interpretations by our Supreme Court."" '0  Another court
declared that antitrust cases "are as important to the preservation of our free-
enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental
personal freedoms."''' In the case of In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation,' 12 the
court received an amicus curiae brief from the Government of Canada which
urged the court to defer to the "critical importance" which Canada attaches to
the policies behind its blocking statute.' " 3 The court declined to do so and
instead granted an order compelling production, stating: "we would be hard
pressed not to accede to the strong national policy of this country to enforce
vigorously its antitrust laws."' 14
In contrast to these public law cases, cases involving tort or contract claims
display less reluctance on the part of courts to defer to foreign interests. For
example, in In re Westinghouse Electric Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation,' '5 the
Tenth Circuit reversed a district court order which imposed sanctions on a
corporate defendant for failing to produce documents located in its Canadian
office which were relevant to a claim based on contract law. In reaching its
decision to defer to the interests of Canada, the Tenth Circuit explicitly
recognized that its decision turned on the fact that the case involved a purely
private civil law claim rather than a criminal investigation or antitrust
action.' 16 Similarly, in an action for personal injuries against a West German
automobile manufacturer, a California Court of Appeals directed the trial
court to set aside an order compelling discovery of documents located in
Germany.' 17 The court found the interests of Germany to prevail and stated
109. Id.
110. United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 903 (2d Cir. 1968).
111. In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1154 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (citing United States
v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972)).
112. 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. I11. 1979).
113. Id. at 1149.
114. Id.
115. 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977).
116. Id. at 999. See also S&S Screw Machine Co. v. Cosa Corp., 647 F. Supp. 600 (M.D. Tenn.
1986). In justification of its decision to grant a protective order to the West German corporate
defendant in a contract case, the court stated: "This is a purely private litigation; no national
interests of the United States are at stake save the interests in efficient functioning of the courts and
justice for the litigation." Id. at 616. Although S&S Screw Machine Co. involved the operation of the
Hague Evidence Convention rather than a West German blocking statute, West Germany's exercise
of its option under the Convention to refuse requests for pre-trial production of documents had the
same effect as imposition of an actual blocking statute. Id. at 617.
117. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Superior Ct., 123 Cal. App. 3d 840, 859-60, 176 Cal.
Rptr. 874, 886 (1981).
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that it regarded its decision as an exercise ofjudicial self-restraint designed to
serve important international goals.' 18
Canadian courts, unlike those of the United States, have openly
acknowledged the crucial importance of the public law/private law distinction
to the question of compelling production of documents whose disclosure is
prohibited by foreign law. For example, in Frischke v. Royal Bank,' 19 the
Ontario Court of Appeals determined that court-ordered disclosure of
information from bank officers in Panama would constitute a breach of
Panamanian law. The court declined to require production in the absence of
a showing of significant Canadian interests that would be furthered by
production.' 20 In unequivocal language, the court acknowledged that such
significant interests had never been found to be present in cases between
private interests. 12 The essential difference between the Canadian and
United States approaches, therefore, is that the rhetoric of Canadian courts
conforms to the substance of their decisions, while most U.S. courts outwardly
claim to engage in comparative interest balancing but in fact base their
determination on the presence or absence of a de minimis U.S. interest. In
specifically rejecting an assessment and balancing of foreign interests, and
requiring instead a straightforward determination of whether the case
involves public or private law, the proposed formulation adheres to the
approach explicitly recognized by the Canadian courts and implicitly
employed by their U.S. counterparts.
C. Actual Barriers and Good Faith
Under the proposed analysis, production should be ordered once a court
in a public law case is satisfied that the information requested is directly
relevant, material, and necessary to the resolution of the case. On the other
hand, in a case involving purely private civil law, the court must further
determine whether sufficient good faith on the part of the party has been
shown and whether the blocking statute presents an actual barrier to
disclosure. The requirement of good faith involves two independent prongs
of analysis. The first prong requires a showing that the requested party has
not relied upon an unjustified or overbroad assertion of the scope and
applicability of the blocking statute, and that reasonable affirmative efforts to
comply with the discovery request were unsuccessful. The second prong
requires a finding that the requested party did not purposefully court the
foreign legal impediments which now block production.
The first prong of the good faith analysis focuses on whether, under the
circumstances of the particular case, the blocking statute does in fact
constitute an actual barrier to production. There are several different types of
foreign blocking statutes. For purposes of analysis, it is possible to divide the
118. 123 Cal. App. 3d at 859, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 885.
119. 17 Ont.2d 388 (1977).
120. Id. at 399.
121. Id. at 400.
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many different blocking statutes into three categories based on the extent to
which they present an actual barrier to production. Those statutes in the first
category present an absolute barrier to production and are exemplified by the
French blocking statute 122 which is self-executing, covers all types of
information requested by a foreign court, is subject to no exceptions, and
cannot be waived.' 23 The South African Protection of Business Act,' 2 4 which
is also self-executing but subject to waiver, is typical of those statutes which
constitute a probable barrier to production. 125 Blocking statutes such as
those of Quebec and Ontario' 2 6 only present a possible barrier to production
because they are not self-executing and instead apply only when provincial
authorities declare them to be applicable.
Because the good faith requirement rests on a determination that the
blocking statute actually prohibits the requested production, the "air-tight"
statutes of the first category which prohibit even a request for (as well as
disclosure of) information 2 7 make further inquiry unnecessary. Cases
involving the second type of statute require an additional showing that the
requested party was unsuccessful in its efforts to secure permission from the
foreign authorities to make the information available. 1 28 Statutes of the third
category involve a more complex inquiry. Bad faith is found when a party
opposing discovery makes unsupported assertions regarding the applicability
of the foreign-law prohibitions. 12 9 As the following analysis of cases involving
the Quebec and Ontario blocking statutes illustrates, courts require the
requested party to bear the burden of proving both an inability to comply and
government objections to compliance.
Few other nations' blocking statutes have received as much recent judicial
scrutiny as Quebec's Business Control Records Act (Quebec Act)' 3 0 and its
nearly identical counterpart, the Ontario Business Records Protection Act
122. See Law No. 80-538, [1980] J.O. 1799, reprinted in Note, Current Developments: The 1980 French
Law on Documents and Information, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 382, 383 (1981).
123. For a discussion of the French blocking statute, see id. at 382-86.
124. The text of the Protection of Business Act is reproduced in A. LOWE, EXTRATERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION: AN ANNOTATED COLLECTION OF LEGAL MATERIALS 132-34 (1983).
125. Id. In the case ofln re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1155 (N.D. I1. 1979), the
South African Minister of Economic Affairs granted the plaintiff permission, pursuant to an
exception contained in the Protection of Business Act, to inspect the requested documents as long as
the documents did not leave South Africa.
126. Quebec Act, supra note 2; Ontario Business Records Protection Act, ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 56,
§ 1-5 (1980) [hereinafter Ontario Act].
127. Brewster, supra note 70, at 68.
128. In a case involving the Canadian Uranium Information Security Regulations, SOR, 76-644
(P.C. 1976-2368, Sept. 21, 1976), promulgated under the authority of Canada's Atomic Energy
Control Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. A-19, the court found that the party's diligent effort to secure a waiver
from Canadian authorities was sufficient to constitute the required showing of good faith. In re
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977).
129. See, e.g., Ohio v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 570 F.2d 1370, 1373 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 833 (1978) (This case held that Andersen's unsubstantiated assertions that the Swiss law
precluded discovery-without an investigation of the context of the requested documents to confirm
that they were within the scope of the Swiss law--"places in substantial doubt the credibility . . . of
Andersen's own insistence that it had 'proceeded in good faith to do the best it can'.").
130. Quebec Act, supra note 2.
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(Ontario Act). 13' The Quebec Act prohibits the removal of any business
information from Quebec pursuant to an order of a foreign court unless such
removal is part of a regular reporting practice by a subsidiary to a foreign
parent. 132 The Quebec Act is not self-executing, but rather subjects a person
or company to criminal sanctions for the production of such documents only
after the Attorney General or a person having an interest in a concern has
filed an application in a provincial court to prevent the imminent removal of
business records from Quebec. 13 3 Although the Quebec Act is worded
broadly to prohibit the removal of documents from Quebec both before and
after an application is filed in a provincial court, criminal penalties are
prescribed only for acts occurring after the application. 134 In cases in which
no applications had been filed in a provincial court, United States courts have
uniformly concluded that the Quebec Act and Ontario Act do not constitute
an actual barrier and consequently that production should be ordered.135 In a
recent case in which an application was filed and the provincial court ordered
the party not to remove documents from Quebec or testify about their
contents, the U.S. court found that the Quebec Act did in fact constitute a
sufficient barrier and therefore refrained from ordering production of the
requested documents. 136
The second prong of the good faith requirement recognizes that a
showing of affirmative efforts to overcome the blocking statute is by itself
insufficient. The requested party's conduct prior to the imposition of the
barrier must also meet the good faith standard. Courts have uniformly
ordered production upon a finding that the party earlier courted the
impediments it now unsuccessfully seeks to have waived. Under the principle
of courting legal impediments, lack of good faith may be predicated on either
a finding that the foreign entity (subsidiary or branch) which possesses the
requested information was artificially created solely for the purpose of
sequestering documents, or a finding that the requested party placed the
131. Ontario Act, supra note 126.
132. Quebec Act, supra note 2, §§ 1-2.
133. Quebec Act, supra note 2, § 4. An attorney representing an officer or shareholder of the
Canadian subsidiary can trigger enforcement of the blocking statute by making an application to the
Quebec Provincial Court informing it that a United States court has requested production of
business records in a manner prohibited by the Quebec Act. Telephone interview with Jean Yves
Bernard, Office of the Attorney-General of Quebec (July 21, 1986).
134. Quebec Act, supra note 2, § 5.
135. See General Atomic Co. v. Exxon Nuclear Co., 90 F.R.D. 290, 294 (S.D. Cal. 1981) (Ontario
Act); Petruska v. Johns-Manville, 83 F.R.D. 32, 37 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (Quebec Act); In re Uranium
Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1143 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (Ontario Act). Although these cases
correctly hold that the Quebec and Ontario Acts are not an actual barrier to production until an
application is filed in a provincial court, they erroneously state that criminal sanctions will not be
issued for removing records from Canada unless the provincial court orders such a prohibition in
response to an application of the Attorney General. In actuality, the Acts provide that imprisonment
for violating the nondisclosure provisions may be imposed once an application is filed in a provincial
court whether or not the court formally orders the furnishing of a security to ensure compliance.
Quebec Act, supra note 2, § 5; Ontario Act, supra note 126, § 2(l)-(2).
136. State v. Keene Corp., No. 1108600, slip op. (Cir. Ct. Md. July 10, 1986) (granting protective
order).
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documents inI the foreign country with knowledge that the nondisclosure law
might frustrate discovery in possible future litigation. 137
Certain limits to the principle of courting legal impediments must be
recognized. For example, when documents originated in the foreign country
and involve sensitive commercial information which is subject to greater
safeguards of confidentiality under the foreign state's laws, it should not be
considered bad faith to keep the documents in that country. Additionally,
informing the foreign authorities of a request for documents that might
contravene the state's nondisclosure laws should not be considered a bad faith
courting of impediments even when the state responds by reinforcing the
application of the blocking statute by issuing an order specifically compelling
noncompliance with the U.S. discovery request. This limit is warranted
because some foreign blocking statutes actually obligate companies to report
any foreign discovery requests. 3 8 Even the United States imposes such an
obligation on U.S. subsidiaries of foreign enterprises that are asked to
produce information sought to enforce the Arab League boycott of Israel.13 9
IV
CONCLUSION
In an early case involving extraterritorial discovery of documents whose
disclosure was prohibited by a blocking statute, the court confidently declared
that "mechanical or overbroad rules of thumb are of little value; what is
required is a careful balancing of the interests involved."' 40 This note has
illustrated, however, that the absence of such concrete rules has led only to
judicial confusion. Extraterritorial discovery law has suffered from a lack of
coherence and predictability which can be imposed only through the adoption
of a conceptual structure and guiding rules. In spite of stubborn judicial
adherence to the rhetoric of comparative interest balancing, such rules are
slowly emerging. Yet these rules have, until now, remained largely obscured
by the verbiage of comparative interest balancing. This note has looked past
form to substance, and has distilled from the case law a new framework which
should ease the burdens and clear the confusion of extraterritorial decision-
making confronting attorneys and judges. The most important aspect of this
new approach is the explicit recognition that interest analysis in
extraterritorial discovery cases should be unilateral rather than comparative,
and should be based on a distinction between cases involving public and
private law.
137. See United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 96 N.M. 155, 233, 629 P.2d 231, 309
(1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 901 (1981).
138. See, e.g., Law No. 80-538, 1980J.O. 1799 (French blocking statute).
139. Export Administration Act of 1979, § 8, 50 U.S.C. § 2407 (1982).
140. United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 901 (2d Cir. 1968).

